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Abstract

The Transformational Haze: Crisis, Shadow Economies, and Global Civil War on the
Venezuela-Colombia Border
Sam Kirsch, Clark University 2019

This paper presents a counter-narrative to the current migration ‘crisis’ on the
Venezuela-Colombia border. Its purpose is to highlight the geopolitical complexities
of this event that are de-emphasized by media and neoliberal discourse. The
frameworks of crisis narrative, shadow economies, and “global civil war” grants us
the analytical lens that will allow us to peer further into the processes that have led
to the Venezuelan migration. Through this lens, I will illuminate intricacies in the
relationship between Colombia, Venezuela, and the West in a way that justifies the
exploration of alternative interpretations to mainstream claims of socialism,
tyranny, and intervention.

Dr. Kenneth MacLean, Ph.D. Chief Instructor
Dr. Nigel Brissett, Ph.D. Assistant Professor
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2014, a steadily increasing number of Venezuelans began to leave
Venezuela and enter Colombia. Five years later, that number is still increasing. For many
Venezuelans, necessities have become increasingly unattainable. Food, fuel, medicine,
electricity, employment, all are dwindling in supply. They find themselves in a position where,
especially for the most vulnerable, their means of livelihood have ceased to exist, thus
rendering them incapable of obtaining the crucial resources needed to survive, let alone thrive.
At the heart of this event lies a regime that has turned inwards. The Maduro
administration has been channeling the country’s remaining resources to the center and
redistributing them vertically amongst the most elite. Since national sovereignty restricts direct
international intervention, and President Maduro’s despotism has governments, agencies, and
administrations asking what to do, the international community is becoming increasingly
concerned as their options to contain the migration diminish.
The influx of Venezuelans is straining Colombian infrastructure. Many Venezuelan
migrants find themselves in precarious situations, many without access to food, water, and
shelter. As we shall see, the media, as well as humanitarian agencies and NGOs, press that this
is a crisis of Biblical proportions. They call for an intervention apparatus that is comprehensive,
all-encompassing, and, I will argue, greatly overestimates the breadth of the problem. This
paper is an examination of what the reason for this overestimation may be.
Worldwide, as many as 3 million Venezuelans are living outside of Venezuela.
Approximately one million are in Colombia. Compared to the Syrian or the South Sudanese
1

migrations, events both deemed ‘crises’ through these same international channels, these
numbers are significantly lower that two other events. Couple this with the displacement
caused by the Colombian civil war, a displacement of approximately 6.1 million persons, and
the current Venezuelan migration diminishes further. There are significant differences between
the three other crises listed above and the Venezuelan migration. We will address these
accordingly, but first we must ask: If the Venezuelan migration is not only smaller than both the
Syrian and South Sudanese migrations as well as internal displacement in Colombia through
which this new migration is moving, then why is it being called a crisis? What does this
determination do? What kind of geopolitical movements does this create? What kind of doors
does this open? What kinds of doors does this close? How does it direct attention? This then
raises even further questions such as who gets to determine a crisis? How is it defined? Whose
interests does it serve? This paper will provide a framework through which we will address
these questions.
The US, the EU, the media, and the international community are promoting the idea
that only national, regional, and international humanitarian intervention can contain and
support the influx of Venezuelans into Colombia. I will argue that the issue is not so much that
Colombia cannot handle the migrants, it is more that the international community is interested
in having them be dependent upon state services as opposed to informal economies, informal
economies that are connected with larger, what we will come to understand as, shadow
economies that threaten neoliberal interests in this part of the world. This paper will argue that
this movement to crisis may represent a neoliberal capitalization on a migration event that will

2

allow international regulation of a borderlands that has been historically resistant to formal
state regulation.
We then ask, “Why has the border been historically resistant to formal state
regulation?” Decades (or centuries, depending on your perspective) of internal conflict,
combined with an expansive transnational indigenous borderland population, some of whom
possess dual citizenship, has created a border culture with a deeply held knowledge of the
almost-200 illegal pathways that span the 1400-kilometer border between Colombia and
Venezuela. These pathways are used for purposes that range from access to food and medicine
to the movement of weapons and narcotics. The entities who utilize these paths range from the
local individual to the international corporation and comprise a spectrum of demographics
containing guerillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers. These groups comprise this shadow
economy.’ It is here that we will focus our attention.
We will be journeying through the current migration, its manifestations, its challenges,
and the border that simultaneously divides the countries as it unites them. From there we will
look at Janet Roitman (Roitman, 2014) to define our understanding of crisis and to make the
connections between her analysis of the 2008 economic crisis and the correlations between the
discourse surrounding that event and the focus of our investigation, the migration from
Venezuela to Colombia. The second part of our theoretical framework will focus on Mark
Duffield (Duffield, 2008). It will elaborate on how crisis fits into his larger framework of the
international policies of containment of non-insured life. It will also connect the self-reliance
practices the poor utilize to resist domination, and then the ways in which power returns to
contain their efforts. To conclude the framework, we will briefly introduce Carolyn Nordstrom
3

(Nordstrom, 2000) and shadow economies for the purpose of providing the groundwork for the
elaboration of Colombian and Venezuelan social, political, and cultural history that will
exemplify the rationale for conceptualizing the interrelation between these myriad actors as
being part of not only Nordstrom’s framework for shadow economies, but also for Duffield’s
processes of containment and Roitman’s analysis of crisis narratives. From there we will look at
the political divides in Colombia that have led to nearly perpetual violent civil conflicts. We will
engage with the legal, illegal, and paralegal groups that have developed as a result before
turning our attention to organized crime in the Venezuela, in the government, and in the armed
forces. We will then bring this information back around into Nordstrom’s shadow economy
framework to show how these different actors interact as a shadow economy not only with one
another, but with the international shadow economy as a whole.
In the pages to come, I will lay out a counter-narrative through which I submit the idea
that other interpretations of the migration are available, ones that do not involve crisis
narratives. Additionally, the discussion of socialism, tyranny, and the need for humanitarian
intervention will come to represent a narrowing of focus that is questionably refined. This
paper will utilize the three frames of crisis narrative, shadow economy, and global civil war to
generate a perspective that expands the analytic lens to encompass a wider spectrum thus
establishing a much more complex picture.

MIGRATION AND THE BORDER
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Approximately 3 million Venezuelans have left Venezuela since 2014 (UNHCR, 2018).
Hyperinflation, economic mismanagement, and a lack of food and medicine are forcing people
to look for livelihood options elsewhere. For many Venezuelans, options are most appealing in
neighboring Colombia. Somewhere between 600,000 and 1 million people have taken up at
least temporary residence there. Some stay in border towns. Those with documentation have
access to state services there, but access to documentation fluctuates and many move into the
larger cities or continue through into Ecuador and Peru. “‘More than a million people have
migrated from Venezuela to Colombia in the last 15 months, of which 250,000 are returning
Colombians and 819,000 are Venezuelans with the intent to stay,’ Felipe Munoz, the Colombian
government’s director of border issues told journalists” (Cobb, 2018).
A variety of factors make Colombia a viable option, the porous nature of the border
being the most important one. South American countries have cooperative documentation
policies when it comes to internal migration. If you are a citizen of one South American country,
going to another one is not a difficult process. Colombia is no exception. Therefore, on a statelevel, the border is relatively easy to cross legally. However, access to appropriate
documentation can be limited to Venezuelans due to bureaucratic quagmire, therefore the
illegal passages are what make this border unique. These illegal paths, called trochas, exist for
several reasons. One is that indigenous groups living on the border have utilized them to
maintain a transnational community (El Pais, 2017). Another is that Colombians and
Venezuelans living in border areas cross the border to take advantage of economic fluctuations
and asymmetries (Dreier & Goodman, 2016). But the major use for the illegal paths has been
the drug and weapons trade (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003). These almost 200 illegal paths created
5

through decades of illicit trade have not only provided clear-cut paths from one country to the
other, but they have created a border culture that is aware of how to both use traverse the
paths physically and utilize them economically. The news publication El Pais did an exhaustive
work on the Colombia-Venezuela border in 2017. A Colombian official, quoted in the report,
says, “[The border] is a structure in which facilitates, by a state route, the trafficking of drugs,
gasoline, food, and minerals, shared by three-armed corps: the Bolivarian National Armed
Forces, the guerillas, and the paramilitaries” (El Pais, 2017).
In Colombia, state-reach is weak. Urban centers possess mostly effective state control,
but the farther one gets from city centers, the more isolated centralized state power becomes
(Marre, 2014). The Colombia-Venezuela borderlands are a place where symbols and signs, roles
and relationships are deconstructed and then reconstructed. The porosity of the border allows
migrants not only the ability to cross, but to gain access to the ability to earn money and
support themselves and their families. They do this through a variety of mechanisms. First,
government subsidies on food and fuel make for lucrative Colombian markets for Venezuelan
products. In addition, as Venezuela’s economy continues to decline, people are smuggling
whatever they can manage over the border. Second, copper piping, furniture, jewelry, illegally
mined products, construction materials, railroad tracks, amongst many others, find themselves
transported across the border, their passage facilitated by easily-bribed Venezuelan soldiers,
Colombian guerillas and drug traffickers. Colombian vendors are more than happy to
accommodate the migrants and their wares. Third, the informal economy that exists in the
border areas offers opportunities for those who cannot access official documentation. Migrants
can earn money in a spectrum of ways ranging from selling hair or candies in the street to
6

construction and infrastructure jobs, to prostitution, drug trafficking, drug production, and
extortion (El Pais, 2017).
On the international stage, the Colombian government receives praise for their
progressive immigration practices in keeping the border open for Venezuelan migrants, but the
fact of the matter, as we will see, is that the Colombian government is incapable of policing the
border because the border is already policed. This is illustrated well when President Maduro
closed the border in 2015 as a response to 3 border guards being killed, allegedly by traffickers.
He declares a state of emergency in 10 municipalities, deploys 5000 more troops, and closes
the border indefinitely. (Ciurlizza & Gunson, 2015) This unilateral shutdown by the Venezuelan
government left the Colombian army on the other side with the task of policing the border by
themselves. Communication between both sides also collapsed. In addition to drastically
increasing their control over the border, the Venezuelan military now maintains a border
monopoly that allows them to squeeze out smaller groups and then consolidate power into the
larger ones thus creating even more powerful groups as a result (El Pais, 2017).
Illicit organizations are deeply embedded not only in the Colombian government and
military, but in international corporate interests as well. These entities manipulate policy to
create the jurisdictional discontinuities that facilitate their entrepreneurial interests. These
relationships, coupled with the daily interactions that locals have with the black markets,
indicate the existence of a powerful ‘shadow economy’ that exists on the Colombia-Venezuela
border (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003).
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CRISIS
When it comes to the migration, the media is alive with claims of a “crisis” (Baddour,
2018) (Cobb, 2018) (Forero, 2018) (Idler, 2017) (BBC News, 2018) (Reuters, 2018). This “exodus”
(Ramsey & Sanchez-Garzoli, 2018), these “throngs of people” (Ciurlizza & Gunson, 2015) whose
plight increases daily are broadcast by most major news sources framed in the language of
crisis. Images of the Simon de Bolivar Bridge in Cucuta in the Norte de Santander, the major
border crossing, show tens of thousands of people clamoring to cross the bridge daily (Watson,
2018). There are images of fatherless families in the streets sleeping on their luggage. There are
images of Venezuelans holding bags of worthless bolivars echoing Weimar Germans carting
around barrels of deutschmarks. There are warnings against drug and human traffickers,
concerns for child welfare, and depictions of clinics and hospitals in border areas overrun with
Venezuelans seeking care (UNHCR, 2018). To compound this, the international organizations
are projecting almost 4 million Venezuelans in Colombia by the end of 2021, and they also
expect the Venezuelan ‘crisis’ to reach “Syria 2014 numbers” (Cobb, 2018)” Publications
abound call for an international reaction. “This should extend not only to mobilizing
international financial resources but also to coordinated and complementary immigration
infrastructure and screening procedures, cooperative mapping of country needs and
capabilities of governments and civil society, burden-sharing for migrant relocation, and
intelligence- and information-sharing among affected countries,” says Olin Wethington (2018).
Eleven countries met in Quito in 2018 and agreed upon conditions for an international
response to the migration crisis. Among the conditions were regular status and asylum,
documentation, humanitarian aid, data collection, anti-gender-based-violence, anti-trafficking,
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anti-xenophobia, and an increase in international support. Regional initiatives consist of greater
interaction between international organizations and regional migration authorities,
ombudsmen, and NGOs. The aim here is to increase collaboration and practice-sharing, to
promote the rights of Venezuelan migrants, and to help them to access services (UNHCR, 2018).
According to Geoff Ramsey of the Washington Office on Latin America, suffering from
post-conflict challenges, the politicization of the Venezuelan crisis, and the lack of state
presence outside of urban centers, the Colombian government has struggled to meet the
demands of the migration event. As far as recommendations for forces external to Colombia,
the call is for the US to lift economic sanctions. Colombia must reaffirm the Cartagena
Declaration, he says, therefore committing to the right to asylum, non-refoulement, and
durable solutions. The US and the international community needs to affirm and assure support
and that regional governments must be sensitive to territory, authority, and culture of
indigenous groups. Additionally, the US would do well to create a special asylum status for
Venezuelans. (Ramsey & Sanchez-Garzoli, 2018)
Amidst this fervor over the crisis, surprisingly quiet is the conversation about what has
led to the porousness of the border. I put forward the reason for this silence is that crisis
narratives and the fevers they inflame allow not only journalists, scholars, and policy makers
the tools to justify their interpretations of history as “fact,” but they also allow power
structures to control narratives through what gets published and what does not.
In her book, Anti-Crisis, Janet Roitman lays out the argument that current “crisis”
narratives operate in such abundance because the conceptualization of ‘crisis’ has shifted.
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Anchoring her work in an examination of the 2008 financial crisis, she explores the ways
economists, journalists, and news and government agencies utilized the term ‘crisis’ to promote
their own narratives and view-points in a way that places the narrator outside of history. She
cites the example rooted in the 2008 crash: “Indignation over the fact that taxpayers financed
the massive translation of private debt into public debt, via a massive devaluation or
expropriation of wealth, lost its political force by replicating the crisis judgment and embarking
without hesitation or modesty on the relentless search for deviance from the sure ground of
true value and the straight path of uncorrupted history” (Roitman, 2014, p. 56). The framing of
my argument in this paper follows this example: crisis narratives regarding the Venezuelan
migration in Colombia seek to dispel conversations regarding the implications of US and
neoliberal policy and their role in the destabilization of the region in a way that echoes
Roitman’s critique of the 2008 economic crash.
Roitman elaborates on this point. Historically, crisis has been used to describe a
turbulent crossroads through which intersecting entities become forever changed, a dialectic.
Roitman argues that this is no longer the case, that crisis has taken on a different presentation.
She says that claims to crisis allow narrators to positions themselves, self-referentially, outside
of history, when, in fact, they are applying their own determinations as to what time is, what is
history is, how time is then divided into history, and vice versa, to statements they believe to be
first-order observations, as well as implying conceptions of how they believe world should be.
For this reason, Roitman believes that claims to crisis are inherently political, they promote
agendas. “Crisis is the unexamined point of departure for narration. It is a blind spot for the
production of knowledge about what constitutes historical significance and about what
10

constitutes social or historical meaning…. (It) implies that crisis is not an event that occurs in a
given context, but that it, in itself, is an experience of historical time.” (Roitman, 2014, p. 66).
“It is a logical observation that generates meaning in a self-referential system, or a non-locus
from which to signify contingency and paradox. And the judgment of crisis is necessarily a posthoc interrogation: what went wrong? Crisis is posited as an a priori; the grounds for crisis are
neither questioned nor made explicit.” (Roitman, 2014, p. 10). In other words, the narrator
fashions a construction of the world in their own image and then applies the concept of crisis to
it. This application always comes after the fact and, driven by hindsight, the narrator is able to
make statements about time, space, history, morality, and the meanings inherent in a
chronology of events.
A brief comparison between displacements in Syria, Colombia, and Venezuela will
further illustrate the cornerstone for questioning the discursive use of ‘crisis’ in the Venezuelan
displacement. So far, approximately 3 million Venezuelans have left. That is about 7% of their
population. Comparatively, Syria, currently, has 5.1 million people who have left the country,
and another 6.5 million remain internally displaced (UNHCR, 2018). In addition, as a result of
their 50-plus year internal conflict, Colombia has approximately 6.5 million internally displaced
people, as well as about 4 million Colombians who left Colombia to seek refuge in Venezuela
(International Diplacement Monitoring Center, 2019). As we can see, the Venezuelan ‘crisis’,
although still a situation to be taken seriously, is surprisingly smaller in scope than both an
event considered a crisis and an event that is not considered a crisis.
There are other conditions that separate Venezuela from both Colombian displacement
as well as Syrian displacement. The first is a lack of internal conflict. Venezuela is a violent
11

place. It has one of the highest homicide rates in South America. There is violent political
repression. Protesters are killed by security forces. There are non-state and para-state groups
that vie for control over the monopoly on violence, but they operate mostly with state
approval, and Venezuela is not an active combat zone, unlike Syria and Colombia. Although
Syria and Colombia do differ in the ways their conflicts play out, there are significant troop
deployments, armed engagements, long-range artillery bombardments, air strikes, and civilian
casualties. Second only to Afghanistan, Colombia has the highest concentration of land mines in
the world. In no way am I downplaying the experiences of Venezuelans or insinuating a
hierarchy of suffering, but I argue that migration due to direct military conflict and migration
due to hyperinflation, government repression, and lack of food and medicine create different
social landscapes and therefore weaken the comparison.
So, if the Venezuelan displacement, quantitatively, falls short of a displacement that has
been described as a ‘crisis’ and also falls short of a displacement that is not only not considered
a crisis, but is happening in the same geographic location as the Venezuelan migration, then
what purpose does branding the Venezuelan migration as a ‘crisis’ serve? The next step to
answering this question is to show the interconnections between state, para-state, and nonstate actors in both Colombia and Venezuela and how they created a shadow economy that is
deeply entrenched in licit market activities. Addressing the root causes not only of the
Venezuelan migration but of the social processes that create and maintain the porosity of the
border would illuminate unfavorable aspects of neoliberal policies and, in the form of cocaine,
commodity fetishism that has created and maintained cultures of violence, repression, and
displacement in Colombia since the 1970’s. Additionally, it would highlight the failures of the
12

War on Drugs and draw attention to the ways in which US military support exacerbated the
conflict and strengthened parastate and non-state groups on the border who facilitate the
migration as well as the illegal border economy. To do this, we will situate these events in front
of the backdrop of the “global civil war.”

GLOBAL CIVIL WAR
It has been shown that migration and displacement in the contemporary world stem
from social conditions directly tied to neoliberal policies. Wise and Covarrubias state that there
are five global economic movements and then three social movements that cause people from
underdeveloped countries to leave their homes in search of refuge or employment. They write,
“After the end of the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism, the crisis of
accumulation and the resulting fall in profitability experienced by the world
capitalist system throughout the 1970s led the core or developed countries, with
the United States at the forefront, to implement a strategy for capitalist
restructuring at a world scale centered on five supplementary mechanisms:
mundialization, neo-liberalization, financialization, militarization, and the
devalorization of labor…. In peripheral or underdeveloped countries, the
implementation of this combined strategy has resulted in three revealing
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movements: (1) the dismantling of the national accumulation pattern and
outward reorientation, leading to the reduction and re-articulation of the
productive apparatus, the contraction of its internal market, the destruction of
subsistence and social security systems, and the expansion of social inequality;
and (2) the generation of a surplus-population due to the liberalization of large
contingents of their means of production and subsistence, which trigger
unemployment and underemployment streaks and an increase in poverty and
misery, in addition to demonstrations of protest, resistance and rebellion. This
situation of social instability leads to state repression, violence, illicit activities
and social insecurity; and (3) the emergence of forced migration. With the
destruction of production and subsistence means, millions of workers and their
families are driven to abandon their places of origin to emigrate elsewhere
within their country or to developed countries demanding cheap labor.” (Wise &
Covarubbias, 2011, pp. 58-59)
These concepts do not apply entirely to the Venezuelan migration nor to the Colombian
conflicts, but they are represented in the histories of both of these countries and they help to
frame the ways in which migration events can be conceptualized. Both Colombia and Venezuela
have encountered aspects of structural adjustment and neoliberalism but, for Colombians, their
historical links to the US regarding Panama, communism, and drugs, and, for Venezuelans, their
rich oil reserves, has tailored the impacts of neoliberal policies to each country individually.
However, economic decisions made within Venezuela contribute directly to the movement of
people out of the country. These decisions are not the direct result of neoliberalism and
14

development in the way described by Wise and Covarrubias, but they are linked to
development in the ways in which under- and undeveloped countries must circumvent licit
institutions in order to maintain power.
Mark Duffield raises attention to the practices of containment and “liberal problematic
of security” which “… prioritizes the security of people rather than states and, as such is often
seen as a progressive turn in international relations” (Duffield, 2008, p. 145). For Duffield,
however, this turn does not hold as much positivity as it presents. It is, in fact, the way in which
the Global North builds barriers to keep out the poor as well as to develop an internal social
structure to integrate those who do manage to cross the barrier as rapidly as possible thus
dispelling the ‘threat’ to internal security. Duffield shows that, through development, the
Global North takes as its object the increasing security over life that he refers to as “insured.”
Locating his argument within the framework of biopolitics, Duffield creates a duality of “insured
vs. non-insured” life. Insured life is the ‘good life’, a consistent existence in the Global North
where “critical infrastructure”’ provides citizens with that which they need to maximize their
self-potential. Non-insured life, on the other hand, exists to provide for insured life and is
responsible for their own self-reliance. That self-reliance, however, often occurs in the forms of
informal, black, and shadow economies. For Duffield, the constant threat of the ingenuity of the
poor to overcome or sidestep self-reliance restrictions is the mechanism through which the
Global North engages “global civil war” against the poor on a perpetual basis.
Now, Duffield’s examples are sited often in the EU, UK, the Middle East, and in Asia. In
order to bring this to our hemisphere, we must follow him into his discussion of ‘new war’ and
how humanitarian aid plays a role in its conceptualization. During the Cold War-era, “Civil war
15

was reinterpreted in terms of irrationality, the breakdown of order, deliberate violations of
human rights, the growth of criminality and the erosion of aggregate self-reliance” (Duffield,
2008, p. 157). Internal conflict in Colombia is rooted in these proxy wars. As we will see, the
struggle between the FARC and the Colombian government from the 1960’s to the 1980’s
became axiomatic of how the US wanted superpower relations to play out. They would support
liberal government, and the Soviets would support the communists and the local groups would
fight it out.
According to Duffield, during the Cold War, political violence was acceptable in the
Global South, but after the fall of the Soviet Union, international response to rebel groups and
the role of humanitarian organizations shifted. Duffield describes this shift as possessing two
modalities of ‘soft power’. The first is negotiated access. The UN would “secure agreement
between the warring parties on the humanitarian terms and conditions whereby civilians could
be accessed…. Apart from its fragility, intrinsic to negotiated access was the implicit recognition
conferred on rebels and other non-state political actor” (Duffield, 2008, pp. 159-160). The
second modality is the shift to integrated mission which “represents a relative closure of
political space. Whereas humanitarian operations had recognized oppositional non-state actors
as the price of access, the integrated mission closes ranks around support for the peace accord”
(Duffield, 2008, pp. 159-160). In shifting from negotiated access to implicit mission, NGOs were
capable of repositioning themselves as gatekeepers to restricted means of self-reliance. By no
longer recognizing rebel groups as legitimate belligerents, development organizations can
circumvent the need for diplomacy and the potential difficulties diplomacy brings. Therefore,
mass consumer society creates the poor. Development fosters self-reliance. Poor create new
16

forms self-reliance. Development disapproves. It tries to contain it. To do so, it delegitimizes
political violence and redistributes that focus onto “defensive development”. Poverty is then
taken as the object and credited with the genesis of violence, terrorism, and conflict.
Development agencies and NGO’s are then positioned strategically to create a “civilian
technology of counterinsurgency” (Duffield, 2008, p. 158).This humanitarian counterinsurgency
seeks to reinforce the ‘ban on the movement on non-insured life’ as well as to destabilize the
shadow economies that develop when people are forced to rely entirely on themselves. I posit
that this one aspect of what is occurring on the Colombia-Venezuela border. Rebel groups and
renegade governments have become unpredictable and neoliberal organizations are
intervening to contain both them and the displacement of non-insured life. To substantiate this
claim, let us look at Carolyn Nordstrom’s theories of shadow economies and how they apply to
Colombia, Venezuela, and the borderlands.

SHADOW ECONOMIES: AN INTRODUCTION
Drug trafficking is a major industry in Colombia. The cartels of the 1970’s and 1980’s
became powerfully violent entities that were capable of making substantial campaign
contributions that continue to haunt politicians years after the cartel’s public demise in the
early 1990’s. Following the narcoterrorismo-era, restructured drug trafficking organizations
would ingratiate themselves with left-wing guerilla groups and right-wing paramilitaries. This
consolidation of control of the drug production and distribution was facilitated by their
interconnection with landowners, ranchers, and corporate and political elites. The area in which
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these groups operated was along the border. As previously stated, state reach is weak.
Borderlands are infamous for being areas where lawlessness is commonplace, especially when
they are comprised of thick rainforests, marshlands, and rivers. However, even in the towns
and cities, illicit trade is all around.
Carolyn Nordstrom speaks of these ‘shadow economies’ as “… vast extra-state networks
that expand across war and peace, and across all the world’s countries” (Nordstrom, 2000, p.
36). They operate on a variety of scales, from the local to the international. They can be as
simple as a single person smuggling fuel over the border on a motorcycle to earn some extra
money to massive criminal networks involving the movement of highly sophisticated
technology. She utilizes the term ‘extra-state’ to draw attention to the condition that these
shadow economies are not separate from states, but they operate through and around them.
The lines between state and non-state become so blurred that the need to create a third
criteria is required, that of the extra-state actor, an organization capable of transcending
traditional networks. It is important to frame the Venezuelan migration in terms of its relation
to the pre-existing shadow economy that exists between Colombia, Venezuela, and
international markets.
However, before we do this, we must recognize that Nordstrom is locating her field
work in Angola and central Africa. As with Duffield we must transpose the argument into our
area of operations across oceans and back to South America. Fifteen years of research has gone
into Nordstrom’s study of shadow economies and how they operate. She finds herself
integrated with armed rebel groups in Angola as they fight for control of the country in the
1990’s. Isolated as an illegal non-combatant group, the rebels are unable to access international
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supply markets. Desperate for weapons, transportation, and communication equipment, they
resort to black market activities: drugs, weapons, and illegal mining. Nordstrom tracks, to the
best of her ability, the complex networks through which rebel groups, seemingly exempt from
international trade, manage to procure equipment of such sophistication that it allows them to
engage state entities in even-handed combat. A network both separate from and deeply
connected to one such as whom Nordstrom’s Angolan rebels aligned exists in Venezuela,
Colombia, and the borderlands. Let us now move to our discussion of organized crime on the
border.

LA VIOLENCIA
Colombia has a history to violence and turmoil. Colonized by the Spanish in 1499, it
declared its independence from Spain in 1810. Simon de Bolivar led rebellious troops to victory
at the Battle of Boyaca, sending the Spaniards out of power (Library of Congress Federal
Research Division, 2007). However, the Colombian elites who replaced the Spanish were cut
from a very similar aristocratic cloth and class stratification becomes integrated into postColonial society (Leech, 2011).
Gran Colombia, comprised of what would become Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Panama, is created. Bolivar becomes the first president. General Francisco de Paula Santander
is the Vice President. The eventual rift between the two sets in motion the Colombian political
divide. Bolivar supporters are authoritarian, aligned with the Church, and are pro-slavery.
Santander supporters are decentralized, anti-clerical, and promote voting rights. These divisions
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will factor in to Colombia’s internal conflicts. Venezuela and Ecuador secede in 1830. Created
then is the Republic of New Granada with Santander as President (1832-1837). Colombia
becomes The Republic of Colombia in 1898. (Library of Congress Federal Research Division,
2007).
Between 1850 and 1899, there are seven separate civil wars as a result of the conflict
between the Conservatives and the Liberals, the followers of Bolivar versus the followers of
Santander. A period of tension known as the Regeneration Period, which lasts from 1878-1900,
culminates in the War of a Thousand days. Beginning in 1899 and ending in 1902, the war
would claim over 100,000 lives and foment nearly inexorable political tensions. These warring
parties are part of the social elite, fighting each other for prestige and power. Caught in the
conflagration are the rural peasants who are callously mistreated, neglected, or utilized
strategically by both sides (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2007).
Peace is achieved in 1902. With clandestine US assistance, Panama secedes in 1903.
Again, we see a period of increasing political tensions erupting into violence. On April 9 th, 1948,
popular Liberal leader Jorge Elicer Gaitan is assassinated. The lower-class Liberals in Bogota,
The Bogetazo, rise up in response. They are met with resistance from the Conservatives. This
violence then spreads to the other major cities. Soon, fighting between the left and the right
has begun all over the country. This period of violence, known simply as La Violencia, will last
until 1948. Liberal and Conservative elites, concerned that the continued fighting would ignite a
peasant uprising, banded together to create the National Front, a military organization for the
purpose of extinguishing the violence before a peasant rebellion could begin (Leech, 2011).
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As La Violencia progressed, the fighting affected the peasantry to a greater and greater
extent. To contend with this, they began to arm themselves. These groups presented a threat
to Colombian status quo that was significant enough to warrant a conjoined, armed response.
Support of the peasants by the Colombian Communist party alarmed the US and, assisted by US
funds, the National Front conducted what was intended to be a final assault on the rebels.
However, all 48 rebels managed to escape. Where they would wind up would create the
traditional homes of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito
de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Colombia’s longest-operating left-wing guerilla groups (Leech,
2011).

NARCOTERRORISMO AND THE REBIRTH OF THE FARC
Some argue that La Violencia concluded with this event in 1958 (Leech, 2011), yet
others feel that the period of instability beginning in 1948 did not end until 1974 citing the
increasing guerrilla war fought between the Colombian government and the guerilla groups in
the countryside, (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003). That peace, however, would be short lived. During
the 1970’s, Colombian cocaine became a commodity in the international, but primarily US, drug
markets. Most of the world’s cocaine is produced in Colombia. 90% of US cocaine comes from
Colombia. The Cali and Medellin Cartels, who would control production and distribution from
the late 1970’s until the early-to-mid 1990’s, gained their infamy in this time. The Medellin
Cartel, led by Pablo Escobar, would make a name for itself through its use of intense violence.
The cartel ended in 1994 with the death of Pablo Escobar by government forces assisted by the
CIA.
21

The Cali cartel, on the other hand, was calculated and patient. It decided to forgo
bloodshed and violence for a more economically stable business model. Rather than control
through force, it utilized political contributions. This allowed the cartel to operate longer and
with less violence than Medellin. The cartel was eventually dissolved in the mid to late 1990’s. It
has taken on several incarnations since then, notably the Norte de Valle cartel, as those who
participate in the drug trade can find new employment. Part of the problem is that the
networks for production and distribution remain unchanged. They simply change hands.
When the cartels dissolved, the gap was then filled in by the FARC. Created in the
countryside during La Violencia, the ideologically-motivated left-wing guerilla group interested
in Guevara-style peasant uprising, began its foray into drug trafficking in earnest in the early
1990’s. Since its inception in 1964 until the early 1980’s, it fought the Colombian government
for in the name of overthrowing urban oppression. Its operations were financed by extortion
and kidnapping. Then, in the early 1980’s, the geographic locations in which the FARC
conducted its operations began to produced cocaine. Integration between the FARC and the
drug traffickers was initially limited, but interconnection between the two parties increased
over time. When the cartels collapsed, the FARC was positioned to easily step in and control the
production and distribution, using it to finance their operations (Library of Congress Federal
Research Division, 2007).
As FARC increased its operations into drug trafficking, they became bolder. In 1982, the
FARC came to the negotiating table for the first time. Promises of political inclusion facilitated
the ceasefire and the FARC established a political branch known as the Union Patrotica, or UP.
Between 1986 and 1990, somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 members of the UP were
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assassinated by right-wing paramilitary groups. The catastrophe of the UP experiment
permanently damaged trust in the Colombian government and caused them to restructure in a
way that increased violence inside of Colombia (Lee, 2012).
The period between 1994 and 1998 saw a spike in FARC-led violence. Several factors
played into this. The first is that the failure of the UP project convinced the FARC that
negotiation was futile, the Colombian government only wanted their destruction, and that they
should reorganized and rearm accordingly. The second is that legal, semi-legal, and illegal
paramilitary groups began to appear, again. These groups were created by a need for wealthy
landowners and other elites to protect themselves against being kidnapped by guerilla groups.
Kidnapping the wealthy is a significant source of income for both the FARC and the ELN. A third
is that the arms race between the FARC and the paramilitaries resulted in the acquisition and
use of increasingly deadly weaponry (Marre, 2014). Cragin and Hoffman observe that, “The US
aid package is widely interpreted in Colombia as a state-to-state arms transfer. Because FARC
competes with the Colombian security forces for military supremacy, it responded to this stateto-state transfer by purchasing more weapons itself. This stimulated, in turn, an increase in AUC
activities to counter FARC, resulting in its own increase in arms procurement (Cragin &
Hoffman, 2003, p. 42).”
As the FARC step up their operations in the mid-to-late 1990’s, they begin to meet
increased resistance. Between the paramilitaries, the Colombian army, and the influx of
weaponry stemming from the 1.3 billion-dollar Plan Colombia, the FARC is almost halved by the
2003. However, a couple of movements happen here. The first is that a round of ill-advised
peace negotiations creates a demilitarized zone in Colombia the size of Switzerland. This allows
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the FARC to hole up and reorganize. The second is that the Plan Colombia is an abject failure.
The increase of violence and the lack of decrease in drug production implies that the US aid
initiative was wholly ineffective and increased instability. The third movement is that the FARC,
whose numbers are now significantly decreased, shifts from large-scale operations to smaller,
daily attacks. In addition, they have laid so many landmines that Colombia is second only to
Afghanistan in the number of active landmines existing in the country currently.
Not only did Plan Colombia cause an arms race, it also re-entrenched anti-state and antiUS sentiments. The aerial spraying of coca crops was ineffective, as it resulted in cultivators
redoubling efforts, and it also destroyed peasant’s cash and subsistence crops. If the goal was
to turn the rural support against the FARC, evidence shows that this was not the outcome.
However, urban resistance towards the FARC has turned against them as a result of the
increased violence (Marre, 2014).
Currently, another round of peace negotiations is ending. Beginning in the Santos
administration in 2012, these appear to be the most successful talks to date. Among the issues
brought to the table are land reform, demobilization/transitional Justice/political participation,
drug trafficking, disarmament, and restitution for conflict victims (Marre, 2014). A change in
administration in 2018 raised concerns that Duque would not be as willing to follow in the
footsteps of his predecessor, but that does not appear to be the case. The FARC is expected to
demobilize, yet, for several reasons, the citizens remain skeptical that the violence will stop.
One of the reasons for the lack of faith is that the ELN, the second major guerilla group
in Colombia, remains active. The ELN began around the same time as the FARC, 1964. Although
grounded in Marxist ideology, more Liberation theology is incorporated into their construction.
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Many of the original members came from the leftist movements in the Churches and
universities. The ELN’s creation was guided by radical Catholics and Marxist academics whereas
the FARC is rooted in peasant rebellion. They followed closer to the Havana school of Marxist
revolution, where the FARC is Moscow (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001).
The ELN is funded mostly through kidnapping and extortion. Like the FARC, they
participate in the kidnapping and ransoming of wealthy landowners and ranchers. They also
participate in economic and infrastructure sabotage. They are feared by the oil companies
whose operations are in areas often controlled by the ELN. The guerrillas then will blow up
pipelines, interrupt shipping, or hold crews hostage for ransom (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001).
The ELN did not participate in the drug trade in the same way that the FARC did. They
facilitate it to some extent. Many of the cocaine producers pay the ELN a tithe but the ELN is
not directly involved. The ELN was hard hit by the Colombian military in the 1960’s. By the end
of the decade, more than half of their leadership had been captured or killed. They were to reemerge in the 1980’s by Father Manuel Perez, the guerilla priest. He united ELN factions
through funds extorted from the multinational oil companies. The organization grew from 800
fighters in 1986 to 3000 in 1996, and then to 3-5000 by 2000 (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001, p. 30).
As we can see, there has been an increase in ELN activity over the past three decades.
They refuse to come to the bargaining table citing lack of trust in the government. There are
rumors currently that they may be considering negotiations, but rumblings of talks are one of
the ways that these groups relieve some of the government and paramilitary pressure. Here is
it important to acknowledge Duffield and the policies of counterinsurgency and containment.
The failures of the peace negotiations between the FARC, the ELN, and the Colombian
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government as well as the failure of Plan Colombia, coupled with the historical interest that the
US has in Colombian affairs, could play a role in the mobilization of humanitarian apparatus. I
acknowledge that what is happening on the border is a multifaceted and complex situation with
many moving parts. However, taking into consideration the ways in which humanitarianism
seeks to control populations as well as to delegitimize political violence, what is happening on
the Colombia-Venezuela border fits into the frameworks described above. By taking over
control of who gets to go where and why, and who has access to services and who does not,
humanitarian organizations serve to circumvent both informal and illicit markets, contain the
movement of “non-insured” life, and quell political violence without having to go through
diplomatic pathways.

THE PRIVATIZATION OF VIOLENCE
One of the other main reasons for the lack of faith in successful disarmament lies with
the aftermath of the 2006 demobilization of the Autodefensas Unitas de Colombia, the AUC.
The AUC is a loose confederation of 7 paramilitary organizations led by the Castano brothers,
brought together to protect right-wing organizations from guerilla incursion. They were the
largest and most infamous of the paramilitaries. They are linked to the drug traffickers and to
wealthy landowners and, as a result of this, possess some level of police support. Even though
they were disbanded in 2006, dissident elements resisted demobilization and the AUC was
considered a terrorist organization until 2011.. This is one of avenues through which faith in the
peace process is lost (Grajales, 2017).
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In July 2003, negotiations with Uribe began. They are were concluded by 2006. 30,150
troops, 17,000 weapons, 117 vehicles, 3 helicopters, 59 urban properties, and 24,000 hectares
of land were turned over to the government. The AUC asked for minimal-to-no prison time,
they would provide no details on political and economic issues as well as anything relating to
drug trafficking, they would retain all of their financial assets, and they would be shielded
against extradition to the United States. The government accepted most of the AUC’s demands.
(Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2007). The underlying issue exemplified here,
and as well as when the EPL disarmed in 1994, about 10% of the most dedicated fighters
declined to demobilize, packed up their weapons, and went back into the jungles to continue
their violent operations. The EPL formed Los Pelusos, and the AUC dissidents created the loose
organization known as Bandas Criminales, or BACRIM (InSight Crime, 2018).
It has been argued that the reason most of the AUC’s demands were met was because
of former President Uribe’s connections to them and their creations. Uribe and his family are
wealthy landowners who were affected by the encroaching rural violence. When Uribe was
governor of Antioquia, he advocated for the establishment of Convivir, a government program
promoted by a new Minister of Defense who advocated to the necessity of paramilitarism to
bring rural insurgency under state control through the establishment of a government
organization that would regulate the private security firms, thus creating “a network of legal
paramilitary organizations controlled by the army (p.34).” Many other ministries rejected the
idea, citing that when they tried this in the early 1980’s the paramilitaries got involved in drug
trafficking, yet the program was still established, and the predictions were correct. Convivir was
intrical in linking corporate interests, the state, and the military in a way that allowed for
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private security firms to elevate their role to that of counterinsurgency. This is a telling example
of the ways in which wealthy elites, paramilitaries, and politicians are interconnected (Grajales,
2017). It also serves to link us back to how shadow economies and self-reliance encapsulate a
variety of licit and illicit political and economic actors.
Paramilitarism and the privatization of violence in Colombia is a complex concept. It
should be conceptualized as a process, not as an organization. The groups are amorphous, their
constructions are dynamic. They shift in and out of legality. Some groups are legal, some of
them are semi-legal, and some of them are illegal. The determinations as to which ones fall into
which categories at which times are fluid and subjective. They vary in size, construction,
intention, and armament. Perez states,

“They are linked early to the drug trafficking networks and their main
organization such as the Medellin cartel, transforming into what is called the
“transnational criminal actor” within the new history of international relations.
They developed counterinsurgency tasks, of dirty war, with the goal of
perpetuating class relations on the country’s internal border, establishing as a
military objective the political organizations of the left such as the UP Patriotic
Union, human rights defenders, trade union leaders, social, student, peasants,
and the civil and defenseless populations… The AUC was the result of a long
history of privatization of violence in the country, articulating itself as an
expansive political and military entity, of parastatal and transnational character,
possessing a counterinsurgent, anti-Communist discourse. Its operation was
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heterogeneous and federative, with important autonomy of its regional Blocks.
In its period of greatest boom (1999-2002) its actions were mobilized by internal
and external interests linked to the drug business and regional and national
elites, who saw them as a force capable of violently resolving class conflict,
sealing the status quo, that of the domination and eliminating by means of the
dirty war the social organizations, union leaders, and political left (Perez, 2016).”

The paramilitary groups effectively close the gap where the state and the army cannot
reach. Although they do operate with varying degrees of legality, their connections to official
state actors as well as their semi-legal and illegal connections to wealthy elites, many of whom
shuffle between private and government institutions, compromises their ability to operate with
full state sanction. Officially. Unofficially, they provide, according to Grajales, a status-quo
based violence that reinforces elite ideology, an ideology that penetrates state organizations,
therefore promoting state interests (Grajales, 2017). This also engages assertion that the state
has lost control over the monopoly of violence. An argument can be made that the military has
indeed lost control of the paramilitary’s use of force, thus the state is losing control of the use
of force however through both the Convivir program and the development of the AUC, an
argument could be made that border policing has less to do with stopping the movement and
securing the border, and more to do with controlling illicit trade and the monopoly of violence
(Rabasa & Chalk, 2001).
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THE HEIRS TO THE CARTELS
When the cartels dissolved, three things happened. The first is that the FARC took over
most of the production and distribution. The second is that what was left of the cartels
factionalized and then restructured in the Norte de Valle cartel. This cartel existed until about
2011 when, though imprisonment and execution, it lost its leadership. This group then
factionalized further into Los Urabenos and Los Rastrojos. Los Urabenos were effectively
demobilized in 2017, but dissident elements have created The Clan de Golfo, or The Gulf Clan
and their activities continue. These groups will be important later in our discussion of the
border. The third is the demobilization of the AUC caused those elements within the AUC
connected to drug trafficking to seek employment with their business associates and thus
dissident BACRIM elements have been absorbed into drug trafficking organizations (InSight
Crime, 2018).
Drug trafficking is a major industry in these isolated border regions. In areas where state
reach is weak, illegal activities thrive, but not just for the profits. For many of the region’s poor,
the drug trade provides employment and economic security where agricultural subsistence has
been affected by corporate agriculture, international finance, and urban elites. People can earn
a living working for illegal organizations in many of the same ways that legal organizations offer.
This sustains those on the fringes. Los Pelusos, Los Rastrojos, and El Clan de Golfo are the major
groups who operate on the border. The work with permission from the FARC and the ELN. They
lack ideological underpinnings. They are entirely in it for business. Their membership is a maze
of interconnections between former guerilla fighters, members of the Medellin and Norte de
Valle Cali cartels, and AUC-turned-BACRIM dissidents. This network is then facilitated by the
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Bolivarian Armed Forces, the FANB, whose Cartel of the Suns facilitates the connection of their
products to greater international markets. Here we see the fusing of a series of groups that
span the full spectrum of legality. From Colombian paramilitaries to the Venezuelan
government, from freedom fighters to agricultural elites, the interests of economic and political
entities converges in a place in the world where “self-reliance” has created a shadow economy
that has proved lucrative for just about every political actor about which one could think.

THE FANB AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN VENEZUELA
Historically linked to Venezuelan politics and state-building dating back to President Jose
Antonio Perez (1830-1835), the Bolivarian Armed Forces (Las Fuerza Armadas Nacional de
Bolivar, the FANB), have been highly influential in politics. Venezuela has had military
dictatorships for the period ranging 1899-1945. A formal military academy was constructed in
1910. Soldiers were revered and respected as important members of society. Hugo Chavez
himself is a product of the 1971 Plan Andres Bello that established a new military school
promoting high academic and military standards for those enrolled. When Chavez was elected
in 1998, he appointed officers throughout his administration. After the 2002 failed coup,
Chavez enacted two rounds of legislation, one in 2002, the other in 2005, that even further
bound the FANB to the state. At this point, the National Armed Forces became the Bolivarian
National Armed Forces to tie their allegiance to Chavismo (Fonseca, Polga-Hecimovich, &
Trinkunas, 2016).
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The FANB is responsible for airport, and port security (globalsecurity.org, n.d.). They also
have jurisdiction over the border. State reach is also weak in Venezuela. As a result of this, the
border area has been taken over by the FANB. Being an official state entity, they have access to
resources that the other illegal groups on the border do not. One of these resources is the
access to legitimate state processes. They use this access as leverage against other illegal
groups. The FANB has also been given control of the oil production and food importation
industries. Combine these levels of oversight with interconnection with members of the
Venezuelan government and illegal groups in Colombia and large-scale criminal activities can be
perpetrated. (Dreier & Goodman, 2016)
The first order of illegal business is the drug trade. Within the high command of the
FANB is an organization referred to as The Cartel of the Suns. The name comes from the stars
on the general’s epaulettes and is used to describe all government officials involved in the drug
trade. It is not really a cartel. It is more like the current incarnation of two decades of “often
competing networks buried deep within the Chavista regime” (InSight Crime, 2018, p. 17).
Cocaine used to run from Colombia through Venezuela and then out the Venezuela coast to the
Dominican Republic or Honduras. Initially, the Venezuela Armed Forces turned a blind eye.
Later on, they began to actively facilitate it (InSight Crime, 2018).
During the 1990’s, the Armed Forces begin allow the ELN and the FARC safe refuge on
the Venezuelan side of the border. These groups begin to develop close links to Venezuelan
officials. Officials implicated in captured FARC documents include Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, the
2008 Minister of Justice and the Interior, code named “El Cojo”, Hugo Armando Carvajal
Barrios, Director of Military Intelligence, Henry Rangel Silva, Director of the Intelligence Police,
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Freddy Bernal, a former mayor who facilitated the training of colectivos in explosives and urban
warfare with the FARC, General Oliver Acala Cordones, intelligence officer Ramon Madriz
Moreno, and General Fabio Zavarse Pabon, commander of the National Guard (InSight Crime,
2018).
The structure for the other illegal activities is located within Venezuela’s artificiallycontrolled exchange rate. There are strict government currency controls. They offer access to
the desirable rate of 10 bolivars to the dollar to some people, while restricting that rate to
others, forcing them to pay the 3000:1 rate on the black market, which is still more desirable
than the standard rate of about 8000:1. This beneficial rate is only offered to those seeking to
buy imported food products. The importers then pocket the difference (Dreier & Goodman,
2016) Currently, Venezuela has heavy government control and intervention as well as economic
policies that discourage entrepreneurship. They have a low respect for contracts. They practice
“wanton expropriations” in addition to their politicized judiciary. The Heritage Foundation ranks
Venezuela 174 out of 177 worldwide in the “Economic Freedom Index”. (Cardenas, 2014).
According to Hannah Drier, one of Venezuela’s most profitable grifts is to take
advantage of the artificially-controlled exchange rate and the heavy subsidies on food and fuel.
Food importers have access to this beneficial exchange rate. They use it to purchase imported
food at standard market rate and then pocket what is left. Since the major international food
exporters refuse to do business with Venezuela, the Venezuelan importers must then do
business with companies that are historically linked to less-than-desirable business ethics and
practices. This results in low-quality food being delivered to Venezuelan markets (Dreier &
Goodman, 2016).
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In addition to concerns about contamination and food spoiling before reaching its final
destination, food insecurity is exacerbated because all food deliveries must go through the
FANB before making it to the markets. In order to leave the ship, a bribe must be paid. To leave
the port by truck, a fee must be paid, and then, after that, the food supplies are picked through
by FANB soldiers who either take the food home to feed their families or use it to extort local
merchants. Food that does not make it to the markets is then smuggled into Colombia where it
can be sold for prices several times that which was paid in Venezuela (Dreier & Goodman,
2016).
Fuel subsidies have created a stratified black market for fuel that begins with the
individual filling as many plastic containers as they can carry to full-size tankers being waved
across the border by freshly-bribed FANB soldiers which change hands between the FANB, the
FARC, the ELN, then down to smaller groups before being sold to Colombian retailers.
Venezuelan fuel is very inexpensive when purchased in Venezuela. Once it is then brought into
Colombia, it goes from 1/100 of a cent to between $2-2.50 (El Pais, 2017). The ELN controls
most of the fuel smuggling. The Tarra River becomes one of their prime transportation
methods. Brazen smugglers pay no heed to concealing their activities and can often be easily
seen hauling contraband from one side to the other (El Pais, 2017).
To combat fuel smuggling, Venezuela offers a chip that allows citizens to purchase a
specific amount of fuel each day. Once that limit is reached, that individual must wait until the
following day to purchase more fuel. This was intended to curb smuggling through restricting
the amount of fuel sold, yet once the sun goes down, the pumps re-open for smugglers for only
smuggler can afford the price of after-hours gas (El Pais, 2017).
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CORRUPTION IN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT
Before we discuss how Maduro has contributed to the Venezuelan decline, we must first
step back and look at the Chavez regime and how it altered the social construction of Venezuela
thus facilitating the integration of criminal elements into its structure. Chavez came to power in
1998 amidst financial and economic crises. He was a dynamic and controversial individual. His
popularity was undeniable. However, much of that popularity was earned and maintained
through public works programs supported by funds not generated by economic savvy, but from
high oil prices. Had Chavez behaved as he did without the strength of oil exports, he might not
have maintained the same level of support (Maya, 2014).
A case can be made that socialism is the cause of Venezuela’s drastic economic
downswing, however, Margarita Lopez Maya argues that Venezuela is not exactly a socialist
country. It fits more into the model of being a populist country with overtones of rentier
socialism. Maya says, “Although scholars have not yet reached a consensus about the nature of
populism, the definition proposed by Ernesto Laclau (2005) describes it as a universal form of
doing politics characterized by an aggressive and polarizing political discourse that divides
society into ‘the people’ (the good, the poor, the powerless) and ‘the oligarchy’ (the bad, the
elite, the powerful). Populist politics centers on a charismatic leader who establishes direct
relationships with his followers, without mediation… Populism privileges the direct relationship
between leader and masses above state institutions and laws, and it tends toward a polarizing,
discrediting discourse that does not tolerate difference and pluralism” (Maya, 2014, p. 69).
However, she does go on to say that some aspects of Chavez’ government do reflect aspects of
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rentier socialism, a political framework that weakens private property and strengthens social
property, therefore she allows that these two lenses create the theoretical contextualization
upon which Chavismo was built.
According to Maya, there are four successful ways in which secured his popular
following by connecting to the populace. He ran an almost permanent campaign. He developed
a powerful media structure that he paid for with the state oil tax. This media structure had 5 TV
channels, dozens of radio stations, websites and street propaganda. “Hello, President” was a
show where Chavez could connect to the population. There was also a restriction on private
media. He also constructed popular neighborhood organizational networks that connected
directly to Chavez. By 2012, there were 40,000 of these organizations. If they supported
Chavez, Chavez would support them. He also created 30 social missions. These operated
parallel to the state and served to undermine resources and state effectiveness (Maya, 2014).
In 2007, he begins his second term amidst contentious election conditions. He begins to
implement his new reforms regardless of their rejection by popular vote. They lacked checksand-balances. They lacked representation. Organized crime begins to penetrate into the
government and violence increases. He created a restructures constitutional reform comprised
of 69 articles that he managed to pass by pressuring the Supreme Court of Justice (Maya, 2014).
By then end of 2010, the Communal State begins to emerge parallel to the CRBV and is
legitimated by popular power. The communal state is a highly centralized system controlled by
an executive branch. Decisions are made through commune counsels. It is structured from
small groups called communes. Those communes are then attached to Socialist cities. These
cities can then form federations and confederations. Big decisions are made in the assemblies
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and then disseminated down into the communes through elected spokespeople. The
communes are not autonomous (Maya, 2014).
Chavez, backed by Venezuela’s massive oil reserves, had the ability to restructure
Venezuela to fit his vision not because his policies worked, but because Venezuela had enough
oil money to prop them up as they foundered. The level of nationalization and restructuring
that occurred was able to happen solely because the price of oil was so high (Maya, 2014). As
we will see, once oil prices plummet and the support system through which the success of
Chavismo was predicated dissolves, what is left is an oligarchy whose participation in illicit
trade has bankrupted a once-wealthy country and is using its infrastructure to continue to
facilitate the movement of cocaine out of South American and up into US markets, in addition
to a variety of other illegal activities.
To further increase corruption in the government, in 2005, Chavez forced out the DEA
and trafficking increased. “Venezuela suddenly became a black hole for US intelligence
gathering in the counter-narcotics fight.” P.19 (InSight Crime, 2018). Since then, 123 individuals
are involved/have been involved in criminal activities including the Vice President, Ministers of
the Interior, Defense, Agriculture, Prisons, Foreign Trade and Investment, and Electricity, as
well as the National Guard, The Armed Forces, and intelligence agency known as SEBIN.
Diosdado Cabello, the second in command of the ruling party, is the focus of US investigations
after a May 2014 Wall Street Journal article vilifies him as a criminal. The Vice President, Tarek
Al Assimi, a name that will come up often in this story, has links to organized crime. Interior
Minister Nestor Revorol has also been indicted in the US for drug trafficking. He is the former
head of the National Guard and has a history of obstructing justice and investigations of drug
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traffickers. Maduro promotes and supports criminals, giving them high-ranking positions in his
government. He ties their success to the success of his regime (InSight Crime, 2018).
As this occurs, power in Venezuela becomes more centralized. Maduro wins the
elections, but not without controversy. His party, however, failed to win congress and he is
faced with an entrenched opposition. He attempts to win popular support but where Chavez
was charismatic and likeable, Maduro is clumsy and corrupt and he fails to win over the people.
Maduro surrounds himself with criminality and uses his position as president to participate and
facilitate many criminal operations, so many that according to InSightCrime.org, a non-profit
organization dedicated to journalistic scholarship regarding organized crime activities in the
Americas, Venezuela is considered a mafia state. They state seven major reasons for this
determination: (1) top level criminal penetration into state institutions, (2) Evidence of
kleptocracy, (3) Devolution of state powers to irregular and illegal actors, (4) Exponential
growth of Venezuelan organized crime, (5) High levels of violence by state and non-state actors,
(6) The Exportation of Criminality (7) Widespread international accusations of criminality
(InSight Crime, 2018, pp. 3-12). Effectively, the Venezuelan government and the military high
command have drained Venezuela’s coffers and are left with only the plentiful illegal and illicit
opportunities through which they can continue to maintain a cash-flow (InSight Crime, 2018).

STREET CRIME IN VENEZUELA
Criminality in Venezuela has bloomed in the recent decades since Chavez created the
“ideological justification for tolerating criminality” (InSight Crime, 2018, p. 7). Historically,
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Venezuela has had little organized crime. Much of it came from the Colombians. In 2013,
Chavez created the Peace Zone Policy. Its goal was to increase social investment into high crime
areas. The result found the mayor responsible for the program becoming indirectly involved
with the gangs. Because of this, no state, municipal, or city security forces could enter these
designated areas. Now possessing control over their territory, the gangs became stronger
(InSight Crime, 2018).
In addition to the Cartel of the Suns and the high-level illegal operation with the
government, the streets have become increasingly dangerous. But the foundations for that
violence, again, stem from Chavez-era policies. Criminality on a local level has increased
drastically under the Maduro administration. There are 89 homicides per 100,000 people
annually. This makes them the most violent in Latin America. There were 26,616 homicides in
2017, 5,500 of them were by security forces, many during heavy-handed responses to protests.
Comparatively, in 1999, when Chavez took power, the rate was 25 per 100,000, and only 6,000
violent deaths total in 1999. Venezuela’s “free elections” are quite suspect. (InSight Crime,
2018).
Chavez barely survived a coup in 2002. When he did, not only did he increase the
amount of FANB members in the administration, but he began to create groups known as Los
Colectivos. As a result of his fears of instability, he begins to develop parallel state structures.
“The Bolivarian Circles,” as they were initially named, were created in 2001 to show their worth
as ‘footsoldiers of Chavismo’ and, by 2006, are receiving weapons as well as state funding
(InSight Crime, 2018).
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Los Colectivos are armed civilian groups that provide some public services but are often
heavily involved in criminal activity. They were directly tied to Chavismo, operating as a bastion
against potential coups. After his death, they remain active yet mostly reject Maduro as being a
worthy successor. They have control over particular neighborhoods. They operate with the
government’s blessing. They are semi-legitimate, and they essentially answer to no one. They
operate a “parallel justice system.” They are used by the government as enforcers to control
local populations as well as assistants in repressing opposition protesters. They are often
funded through extortion, gambling, prostitution, and the drug and weapons trade. (InSight
Crime, 2018).
A higher level of criminal organization is a direct result of prison reforms that
concentrated power into the hands of powerful pranes, The Pranes are prison kingpins whose
influence, as a result of reformations in Venezuelan prison policy, has extended past the prison
walls and out into the world itself. Through proxies called trenes, they control neighborhoods,
weapons, drugs, and illegal mining activities. They associate with criminal gangs known as
Megabandas. These groups participate in extortion, kidnapping, drugs, theft, and grand theft
auto. In Venezuela, there are 12-16 active Megabandas, some with over 300 members (InSight
Crime, 2018).
When Maduro came into power in 2014, he had to surmount a variety of institutional
obstacles created when Chavez-era policies established the economic conditions that would
facilitate the on-coming collapse. He faced infrastructure breakdowns, electricity shortages,
scarcity of basic items, rampant inflation, declining production, over-valued currency, rampant
street crime, the falling production of oil and oil revenues, the loss of international reserves, an
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inflation rate at 55%, $85 billion in national debt (about 70% of their GDP), and a highly
problematic currency exchange policy (Cardenas, 2014). Dependence on oil exports to furnish
food and supply imports left business owners without the capital to afford imported supplies
nor to have access to a national production economy that could make them domestically
(Cardenas, 2014). Combine this with the rampant criminality within the government and the
armed forces, add staggering hyperinflation, lack of access to medicine, lack of access to food,
and the conditions for creating the rationale amongst the population that a better life could
exist elsewhere begin to manifest.

SHADOW ECONOMIES: AN ANALYSIS
Let us now bring this back around to our conversation regarding shadow economies.
Remembering that Carolyn Nordstrom anchors her explication of shadow economy in her work
with rebel fighters in Angola in the 1990’s, she observes that although they are isolated from
state markets, they still manage to acquire highly-sophisticated weaponry and communications
technology. To determine how they acquire that equipment, Nordstrom conceptualizes
transnational linkages represent a stratification of interaction that exists on a local scale, on an
international scale, and everything in between. Taking into consideration the analytical
limitations on charting extra-legal activities, she cites five criteria through which shadow
economies can be analyzed. I will use this framework to illustrate the ways in which the actors
described above interact to create a shadow economy that exists on the Colombia-Venezuela
border.
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1. Profitable trade in illicit and dangerous goods is intricately tied to informal trade.
Weaving through the border is a complex network of up to 200 illegal trails called
trochas. These trails have been created for reasons such as maintaining transnational
communities for the indigenous groups who live in the border areas to providing passageways
for Venezuelan and Colombian citizens to access favorable fluctuations in exchange rates as
well as food and medicine. The regular usage of these paths by licit groups keeps them open
and functioning. As the Venezuelan economic situation continues to deteriorate, and illegal
groups expand their opportunities for income generation, these paths offer methods of
transportation for the myriad goods smuggled from Venezuela by average citizens looking for
ways to earn money. It also appears that the ways these paths are used by guerillas and drug
traffickers and the ways in which regular citizens can make capitalize on those opportunities are
almost common knowledge. Additionally, the interconnections between individuals looking for
work in border towns and the labor requirements of the illegal organizations often can find
mutually beneficial arrangements. Illegal groups are more than willing to recruit day-laborers,
smugglers, prostitutes, transporters, packers, pickers, trimmers, processors, and runners, to
name a few. These individuals on the local level are responsible for providing the oil that drives
the engine of shadow economies. Without the local assistance, these networks would find
increased operational difficulties.
2. Clear distinctions between legal and illegal, state and non-state, or local and international are
often impossible to make.
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In both of these countries, this criteria is overwhelmingly evident. For Colombia, the
blurred lines between legal and illegal, state and non-state can be best observed in the
paramilitary practices and the privatization of violence. Through the Convivir program, the
Colombian government established a counterinsurgency program that is linked to the state and
elite interests, thus maintaining the status quo in a way that vacillates from sanctioned police
actions to terrorism. Additionally, their connections to narcotics trafficking highlights the ways
in which corporate interests, state power, violence, and illicit trade come together. The ways in
which these groups obtain weaponry also vacillates from state pathways to their interactions
with drug and weapons traffickers. However, Uribe’s peace agreement that solidified the AUC
demobilization effectively sealed the AUC record books regarding their business dealings so
these element may never be truly revealed. His links to Convivir and the development of private
security in Colombia further exemplifies the interconnections mentioned above.
To bring this to the local/international relationship, US intervention in Colombian affairs
has been endemic to Colombian politics since the US assisted Panama is seceding in 1903. Since
then, US presence has been a constant specter overseeing Colombia’s relationships to itself as
well as the external regional and international community. What operates as a Colombian
policy and what operates as a US satellite policy blur the lines between Colombian internal
politics and their strategic linking to international networks.
On the Venezuelan side, all of these factors come together in the analysis of the
Venezuelan government, including the military. The participation of all of these actors in not
only licit and illicit trade but the ways in which licit trade can be manipulated to produce semi-
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legal, ethically-ambiguous grey markets, entirely negates conceptions of binaries amongst
analysis of Venezuelan legality.
3. Illicit and extra-state trade is, ironically, linked to development.
Nordstrom says, “As dangerous and illegal as drug and illicit weapons trade may be it is
often the means by which citizens can gain the currency to buy industrial necessities,
agricultural supplies, and development goods. Such illicit goods purchase hard currency, they
broker power, they allow investments into land, legal industries and political partnerships”
(Nordstrom, 2000, p. 43). This is echoed by Duffield as well in his analysis of the social
structures that develop shadow economies. It should be noted here, however, that Nordstrom
locates her research in central Africa. Development in central Africa is different than
development in South America. They have many similar characteristics, both when viewed from
a colonial and a neoliberal perspective. However, post-colonially, they differ. Without diving
into a history of decolonization, I will drastically over-simplify the situation to: decolonization in
central Africa is imbued with different dispositifs of the colonial era than decolonization in
Colombia and Venezuela. In addition, the processes and ideologies of colonization were
different (see: Williams 2010; Hall 1992; Rodney 1972).
Neo-liberal development and Cold War and post-Cold War politics, on the other hand,
has a combined impact on both central Africa and Colombia/Venezuela but let us turn our
attention to how it affects latter. US territorial ambitions beginning at the end of the 19th
century paint the picture for US intervention into South America. Support of the Colombian
status quo against communism in the 1950’s and 1960’s turned into aid for the War on Drugs
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that blended with further anti-communist counterinsurgency defined by a consistent increase
in violence. The violence between the Colombian elites that has existed in Colombia since its
inception is related to the relationships between Colombian elites and transnational business
interests. As exemplified in the period from the War of One Thousand Days through La
Violencia to Plan Colombia to today, violence in Colombia is defined by urban elites
consolidating power by taking land and resources and dividing them amongst foreign actors.
Internal conflict stems from the reaction in the peasantry to repressive and exploitative state
practices. Illicit trade, especially in weapons and narcotics, provides currency to exchange for
goods and equipment, both for guerillas and peasant farmers. These states that promote
exploitative practices are often linked to international corporations. These corporations, as
exemplified by Grajales in his explication of the links between agribusiness and Colombian
paramilitarism (Grajales, 2017), operate in a relationship with the state that promotes their
own interests over national interests in a way that aligns with current neoliberal practices.
Thus, through the restrictive practices of neoliberal organizations, internal conflict and
displacement leading to the need for the creation of alternative markets to satisfy both
revolutionary ambitions and to establish a means through which isolated communities,
negated, invisibilized, or exploited, could access market products.
4. Illicit transaction and development link with political power
“Business people who profit from shadow transactions are unlikely to give up shadow
sources of power, profit and supply as they develop legitimate enterprise, and in fact, their
success may depend on keeping these networks current,” says Nordstrom (Nordstrom, 2000, p.
43). This is evidenced across the board in this circumstance. In Colombia, there are countless
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instances of government officials being linked with traffickers, paramilitaries, guerillas, and the
FANB. Politicians received donations from the cartels in the 1980’s. Wealthy landowners hired
private security firms who would then participate is semi-government sanctioned
counterinsurgency operations, sometimes with excessive enthusiasm. These landowners would
then, down the road, run for office. They get elected and they bring all of their old friends with
them, so to speak. In Venezuela, the penetration of the Cartel of the Sun not only into the
military and the government but, through their control of the oil and food production, have
positioned themselves to make key legislative decisions, often in ways that benefit them. The
Panamanian Government considers 54 Venezuelan government figures, including Maduro, to
be “high risk” for money laundering and financial terrorism. The European Union has sanctions
on 7 senior Venezuelan officials. Interior Minister Nestor Revorol has been indicted in the US
for drug trafficking. He is the former head of the National Guard and has a history of
obstructing justice and investigations of drug traffickers. According to InsightCrime, “The
penetration of so many key institutions, and the fact that they constitute the state’s main
organs in the fight against organized crime, means that Venezuela cannot even contain
organized crime, let alone effectively fight it” (InSight Crime, 2018, p. 4).
5. The junctures of licit/illicit economy shape formal global markets
Nordstrom states, “It is important to remember that all the goods that enter countries
outside formal state channels constitute profits for legitimate businesses in industrial centers in
the world…. This vast set of global shadow exchanges affects global pricing, stock markets,
interest rates and exchange rates (Nordstrom, 2000, p. 44).” As evidenced by Colombian
agriculture, both legal and illegal, and Venezuelan oil and food markets, the shadow economy
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that exists between these two countries is enmeshed with international finance in a way
supports Nordstrom’s claim regarding the interconnectedness of licit and illicit markets.
Additionally, although Venezuela has sanctions placed upon it by the US, UK, and EU, it still
manages to find both corporations and countries with which to do business. Oil and agricultural
land are still lucrative commodities. Historically, transnational business is interested in
maintaining unstable states in countries with these resources.
As is outlined above, a complex shadow economy exists in the borderlands between
Colombia and Venezuela. This shadow economy is a product of Duffield’s process of selfreliance. The lack of state reach isolates those who live in the borderlands. As a result of this,
they must develop networks through which resources can be acquired. Drug and weapons
trafficking, food and fuel smuggling, currency exchange, and the trade in counterfeit and stolen
medication provide powerful economic possibilities for people in need of basic necessities.
These networks are not just ruthless criminals vying for power and domination. Shadow
economies also reflect the day-to-day ways through which the average citizen, isolated and
restricted from state services, puts a roof over their head, food on their table, and clothes on
their back. As exemplified by the migration into Colombia, Venezuelans have created
sophisticated systems of self-reliance that capitalize on the border. This allows them to cross it
and to utilize it economically. Coupled with the on-going struggle to control illicit trade along
the border, the migration has, as exemplified by Duffield, created the conditions where
humanitarianism-as-counterinsurgency could operate as a viable, neoliberal solution that
would a) control and contain a migration event and, b) help to stifle political violence. It should
be noted also that this is an ongoing situation and the implications that the destabilization of
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Venezuela has for US foreign policy are multifaceted to say the least, therefore containment
and counterinsurgency may not be the only opportunities catching the neoliberal eye at the
moment.

CONCLUSION
The elements discussed above serve to paint a picture of the shadow economy that
exists on the Colombia-Venezuela border and how it connects to the Venezuelan government in
a way that incentivizes the current destructive policies of the Maduro administration, as well as
anchors us in the political ideology of the nation causing the movement of people. Taken
together, crisis narratives, the global war on the poor, and shadow economies illustrate the
discursive movements that international organizations make to restrict the movement of noninsured life as well as to undermine these powerful shadow economies that transcend many
conceptions of politics, economics, and sociology.
Seen in this context, crisis narratives gain grant funding, they motivate investment and
donation, they legitimize historical perspectives, and they facilitate the promotion of
organizational agendas. Simultaneously, they focus attention on neoliberalism and its
humanitarian apparatus as the appropriate solution. As we have seen above, that apparatus
serves as an extension of the politics of containment and is a powerful tool for
counterinsurgency. It serves to undermine involvement in the shadow economy by replacing
self-reliance with international aid. The neoliberal movement would prefer that the poor be
dependent upon regime services as opposed to shadow economics. To briefly summarize, crisis
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narrative provides the discursive movements needed to legitimize humanitarian intervention in
a part of the world that has been, historically, left to its own devices. That international neglect
has created a shadow economy that is strong enough to provide outlets for migrant
populations on both sides of the border. I argue that the move for crisis narratives and
humanitarian intervention in an event that is on a smaller scale than other “crises” could be
indicative of a neoliberal movement to capitalize on the containment of an area that has been
resistant to international interests. In saying this, I acknowledge the significant complexity of
this event and the fact that my analysis here could be one of many angles of approach.
However, the purpose here is not to make bold statements about what is and what is not
happening, the purpose is to raise awareness that this issue is not a cut-and-dry as the media
and the institutions would have you believe. This is not necessarily an issue of tyrants, oil,
socialism, and questionable US foreign policy practices. When seen through the lens of crisis,
shadow economy, and global civil war, a much more complicated picture emerges. This picture
incorporates colonization, de-colonization, inappropriate US intervention, the Cold War, the
Drug War, and the impact of transnational corporate interests to discuss what happens to
countries that are exploited so that mass consumer society can continue to consume past its
means.
President Maduro’s administration not alone in bearing the responsibility for the
migration events. They are aided by structures from the Chavez-era as well as connections
made between them and Colombian guerilla, paramilitary, and drug trafficking groups. These
connections are then facilitated by their linkages to these transnational shadow economies that
keep money and products flowing in and out of the country. This ‘crisis’ may not about
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socialism or tyranny. It may be about the fact that a giant spotlight, in the form of a mass
migration, has just been pointed on a part of the world where the binaries of licit and illicit,
state and non-state, legal and illegal dissolve into a spectrum of configurations in a place and a
time where, if they are not careful, they can be observed in a way that allows for investigation.
Crisis narratives allows discursive control as well as promotion for humanitarian aid. Aid
operates as a neoliberal apparatus of ‘civilian counterinsurgency’ to re-establish policies of
containment and de-legitimize political violence to further insulate insured life. This harkens
back to Duffield and his observations of New War and the changes in international apparatus to
snuff out insurrection and control populations.
Although humanitarian intervention is warranted in order to give vulnerable people
access to necessities, it is not a long-term solution. To make it into a long-term solution turns it
into a self-perpetuating organization that will produce the conditions it seeks to assuage. I
argue that both increasing and reducing sanctions and economic pressure will remain
ineffective as well. Addressing this issue effectively means asking questions about ourselves and
our relationship with neoliberal ideology. Even if somehow the Maduro administration came
back in line with neoliberal practices, what is likely to happen is that the system of repression
and containment will continue. The West has an idea about how history is supposed to be. That
idea is conveyed through the media and academia to the population, incentivized by
institutions through academic credibility and journalistic praise, to support the aid
organizations who then perform as the apparatus through which the West maintains its
containment of the life through which it has extracted its own. With this idea in mind, is it not
more effective to lean towards introspection as opposed to being reactionary? Perhaps if we
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want to help Colombia and Venezuela achieve the stability that allows them to care for their
people, food and water is, of course, a great place to start, but after that, taking the time to
look at our own society and ask ourselves why, regardless of decades of development and
countless billions of dollars of aid circulating, has the gap between the rich and the poor has
increased - and is still increasing?
An important lesson to take from Roitman is this:
“The point is to take note of the effects of the claim to crisis, and to take note of
the effects of our very accession to that judgment. The forms of critique
engendered by crisis serve to politicize interest groups for a critique of
capitalism. This is a politics of crisis. Moving beyond this point of crisis, one might
insist that effective forms of critique would instead engender new forms of
knowledge such that, for instance, the very boundary between ‘the economic’
and ‘the political” would be reorganized or transformed. But this has not
obtained. The crisis of the subject- be it neoliberal or indebted capitalist- entails
an epistemological crisis that could only be apprehended through the cognizance
of a transformation in the rules for making meaningful statements” (Roitman,
2014, p. 69).
In other words, we could stand to reconceptualize our relationship to crisis and not define
ourselves as living in a point in history but as being a part of a continuum: a flexible, fluctuating
space that ebbs, flows, and adjusts to internal and external stimuli. We might also do well to
maintain the understanding that the use of the term crisis means that someone is trying to sell
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you something. Unless this individual narrator is somehow situated in a position located outside
of time, and outside of history, where they, in their omnipresent and singular vision, are
capable of determining good from evil, right from wrong, and truth from non-truth, they lack
the perspective required to make such a claim. Therefore, in closing, conceptions of the
Colombia-Venezuela ‘crisis,’ as such, imply the promotion of viewpoints that promote
neoliberal solutions to neoliberal problems and perpetuate the cycle of asymmetrical binaries
from which they are claiming that the acts of Western paternalistic generosity will lead to a
harmonious balance of imbalance. I suggest that we not take this discourse at face value
because, as evidenced above, this story goes beyond what is broadcast.
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